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SELLER'S CONFLICTING DEFAULT RIGHTS
UNDER ARTICLES 2 AND 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
James L. Carpenter, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or the Code) was
intended to be a unified statute covering a broad range of
commercial problems.' Its nine substantive Articles cover
the major commercial issues applicable to modem business
activity, 2 and any commercial transaction may involve more
than one of the Articles.3 Recently, however, problems have
been encountered concerning the relationships between Arti-
cles. It is becoming more apparent that the U.C.C. is not
totally integrated, and that approaches must be developed for
resolving its internal conflicts.
Frequent problems have arisen involving the interface be-
tween Articles 2 and 9 of the Code. The sale of goods, probably
the most common commercial transaction, may be accompa-
nied by an Article 9 interest securing payment to the seller. A
third party, such as a lien creditor or secured lender, may also
have an interest in the goods. The differing interests of seller,
1979 by James L. Carpenter, Jr.
* B.A., 1975, University of Colorado; J.D., 1978, Stanford University School of
Law; Member, State Bar of Colorado. The author'wishes to express his gratitude to
Professor Thomas Jackson, Stanford School of Law, for his insightful criticism and
suggestions during the preparation of this article.
1. See Hawkland, Article 9 Methodology, 9 WAYNE L. Rzv. 531, 532 (1963)
("[The U.C.C.] is a single, integrated statute, systematically coordinated in such a
way that intended answers should emerge from it.").
2. Article 1 contains general provisions governing the construction, application,
and interpretation of the Code, and also includes a number of definitions applicable
to the Code generally. Article 2 deals with sales transactions, focusing on the relation-
ship between the buyer and the seller. Article 3 covers commercial paper such as
checks, notes, and other instruments. Article 4 is entitled Bank Deposits and
Collections and applies to relationships between each bank and its customers. Article
5 governs letters of credit, and Article 6 covers bulk transfers. Documents of title,
including warehouse receipts and bills of lading, come within the scope of Article 7,
and Article 8 is mainly technical rules concerning investment securities. Article 9, the
last substantive article, deals with secured transactions. References to Article 9
throughout this article will be to the 1972 Official Text.
3. A shipment of goods from buyer to seller via commercial carrier, for example,
will be governed by both the Sales Article, Article 2, and the Documents of Title
Article, Article 7. The simple purchase of goods with a check can include problems
arising under Articles 2, 3, and 4.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
buyer, lien creditor, and secured lender interrelate and in cer-
tain situations, create problems that are not resolved clearly
under either Article 2 or Article 9. The issue of priority in the
goods upon the buyer's insolvency has attracted both litigation4
and comment.5 A closely related issue, however, has been al-
most ignored: do the default rights of Article 2 or of Article 9
apply to resale of the goods when the buyer breaches obliga-
tions to the seller?' Article 2, consistent with its focus on the
sales transaction, gives maximum rights on resale to the seller.
Article 9, however, is more concerned with the protection of.
third-party interests, and therefore gives more rights to both
the buyer and secured party, with accompanying duties im-
posed on the seller to protect those rights. Under certain cir-
cumstances, application of one Article over the other will pro-
duce drastically different results.
This Article analyzes the seller's various rights and duties
on resale of goods after buyer's breach and explores when these
rights and duties should be governed by each Article. It first
sets forth the basic fact situation to be considered and intro-
duces the conflicts in the legal rights of the parties to the trans-
action. After exploring the differing default rules of Articles 2
and 9, it concludes that when such conflicts exist, the choice
of Article will be significant only if the goods to be resold are
worth more than the obligation owed to the seller. Finally, it
considers the problem of who is entitled to those excess pro-
ceeds of resale. It concludes that, with one exception, the seller
is entitled to excess proceeds before the goods have been deliv-
ered to the buyer, and that the buyer or third parties are enti-
tled to those proceeds after delivery. That conclusion is the
4. E.g., In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976), revising en bane
510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975) (conflict between the seller of goods and the secured party
with an after-acquired property interest upon buyer's insolvency), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 834 (1976); In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968) (conflict
between the trustee in bankruptcy and the reclaiming seller under U.C.C. § 2-702(2)).
5. E.g., J. HoNNoLD, LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 347-48 (4th ed. 1976) (the
Mel Golde problem); McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S.
CAL. L. REv. 429 (1977) (the Samuels problem).
6. The literature contains very few references to this problem. The only discus-
sions going beyond a superficial level are found in Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncer-
tainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907, 942-47 (1978); Jackson
& Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALz L.J. 1, 3 n.12 (1975); Speidel,
Advance Payments in Contracts for Sale of Manufactured Goods: A Look at the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 52 C"Lw. L. Rev. 281, 302-05 (1964); none of them resolve the
conflict analyzed herein. The problem is also noted in J. HONNOLD, supra note 5, at
533-34; Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform Commercial
Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U. L. Rzv. 571 (1958).
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same whether or not the seller has taken a consensual Article
9 security interest.
THE BASIC FACT PATTERN
The conflicts in U.C.C. default rights occur primarily in
circumstances similar to the following basic fact situation. M,
a manufacturer, enters into a contract with W, a wholesale
dealer of televisions, stereos, and similar goods, for the sale of
one hundred television sets. For Article 2 purposes, M is the
seller and W is the buyer. Concurrent with the sale, M takes
an Article 9 security interest in the television sets to be sold to
W. For Article 9 purposes, M is the secured party and W is the
debtor. L, a bank, lends money to W, and as part of that loan
transaction, L takes a security interest in "all personal prop-
erty of W, wherever it may be found." " Thus, L is also a secured
party and W is once again a debtor.
At any stage of the transactions, W may default and con-
flicts may arise among M, W, and L. Either M or L may claim
a priority interest in the goods and the right to possession. If
the default occurs while the goods are still in M's possession or
7. By taking a consensual security interest in the goods sold to W, M took a
"purchase money security interest" for purposes of Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-107. The
distinction between purchase money security interests and other security interests is
not critical to this article except insofar as it validates the priority of M that is assumed
throughout. For perfection and priority purposes under Article 9, the purchase money
secured party is basically the highest form of life. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2) (10-
day grace period for filing), 9-302(1)(d) (filing unnecessary in some cases), 9-312(3),
(4) (general priority for purchase money security interests). See note 83 infra, for a
discussion of the validity of the assumption concerning M's priority under Article 9.
For default purposes, purchase money secured creditors are treated the same as other
secured parties, so the distinction is not critical herein.
8. L has previously perfected this security interest by entering into a written
agreement with W that adequately describes the collateral, giving value by loaning W
money, and filing an adequate financing statement in the appropriate location. U.C.C.
§§ 9-203 (attachment of the interest), 9-303 (perfection equals attachment plus filing).
The interest becomes perfected in these goods as soon as W gains rights in the collat-
eral. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
9. Two parties are omitted from this analysis who might normally be considered
in multi-party conflicts: a buyer from W and the creditor with a lien on W's property.
See, e.g., Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 947-49. The buyer is excluded because
inclusion would seriously undermine the assumed priority of M in these circumstances.
A buyer in the ordinary course will normally have priority over both sellers and secured
parties, at least before delivery, id. at 949-55, and such priority vitiates the importance
of the differing default rights discussed in this article. The lien creditor or its alter ego,
the trustee in bankruptcy under § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970),
is on the same basis as the secured party. The default rights given by Article 9 to
subordinate secured parties should be read broadly to include lienholders in the rights
to force resale, to redeem the goods, or to receive the surplus on resale. 2 G. GMoRz,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.8, at 1250 (1965).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
during delivery to W, it is likely that M will prevail. 0 Once
delivery has taken place, however, both M and L may have a
valid claim to possession." Throughout this Article, M will be
assumed to have priority." The more relevant conflicts for pur-
poses of this Article, however, concern the relative rights of the
parties on resale. Several questions arise. If M has either main-
tained or regained possession, which Article governs its rights
and duties on resale? Is M entitled to retain possession of the
goods for its own use over the objection of W or L? 3 May W or
L redeem the goods by paying the obligation owed to M?'4 Is
M required to notify W or L of a proposed resale of the goods?"
Finally, which of the parties-M, W, or L-are entitled to the
proceeds of the resale in excess of M's obligation?" The resolu-
tion of these issues turns on whether Article 2 or Article 9
applies to the default procedures. Because the seller can also
be characterized as a secured party, either Article could logi-
cally apply. An exploration of the parties' rights under the two
Articles will demonstrate the differing results.
RIGHTS ON RESALE UNDER ARTICLES 2 AND 9
Both Article 2 and Article 9 envision resale of the goods as
a remedy upon the buyer's default. The provisions governing
resale are not equivalent, however. The differences are a reflec-
tion of the historically divergent treatment of secured and un-
secured sales. The common law distinctions between the rights
available to a conditional seller and the rights available pur-
suant to the seller's lien are continued in the U.C.C. For pur-
10. Prior to delivery, M has greater power over the goods. See U.C.C. §§ 2-703
(right to withhold or cancel), 2-705 (right to stop in transit). These powers over the
goods, which are inventory under Article 9, are probably security interests subject to
Article 9 coverage, but are perfected without filing prior to delivery of the goods to W.
U.C.C. § 9-113(b). Therefore, M as a purchase money secured party has priority in the
goods as against L without taking any other action. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). See note 83
infra.
11. After delivery of the goods to W, M's interest in the goods would have to be
perfected in accordance with Article 9 prior to delivery in order to retain its priority
over L. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). See note 83 infra.
12. If L has priority in the goods, the issues are easily resolved. L can only get
such priority pursuant to Article 9, and Article 9 default rules would apply in such a
case. For a discussion of the general validity of the assumption that M has priority,
see note 83 infra. For a possible argument that L could also get priority under Article
2, see note 109 infra.
13. See U.C.C. § 9-505.
14. See id. § 9-506.
15. See id. §§ 2-706(3), (4), 9-504(3).
16. See id. §§ 2-706(6), 9-504(1), (2).
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poses of simplicity, M is referred to as "seller" and W as
"buyer," although for Article 9 purposes they would more pro-
perly be referred to as the "secured party" and the "debtor."
The Right to Excess Profits
The foundation for all the differences between Articles 2
and 9 concerning the parties' relative rights on resale is the
right to any profit made on such disposition. Under both Arti-
cles, the proceeds on resale are applied first to the expenses of
the resale, and then to the underlying obligation of the seller. 7
The rules diverge, however, in treating the profit recovered on
resale.
At common law 8 and under the Uniform Sales Act,' the
seller was entitled to any profit from the resale. Section 2-
706(6) of the U.C.C. continues this rule, so under Article 2, M
would be entitled to the excess proceeds, at least as against
W. 20 Conversely, under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the
conditional seller had no right to excess profits,2 a rule carried
over into the Code at Section 9-504.22 That section provides
that after paying the underlying obligation and the expenses of
resale, any excess proceeds shall be applied first to subordinate
security interests. Thus, the excess proceeds would be applied
first to satisfy the obligation to L. Any remaining surplus would
be returned to W This rule is buttressed by other Article 9
rights described in the following sections.
17. Id. §§ 2-706(1), 9-504(1)(a), (b). For our purposes, profits and excess proceeds
refer to proceeds of resale that exceed the sum of expenses incurred by the seller after
breach plus the obligation owed to the seller.
18. E.g., Warren v. Buckminster, 24 N.H. 336 (1852); Bridgford v. Crocker, 60
N.Y. 627 (1875). See 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GooDs § 553 (rev. ed. 1948).
19. After resale of the goods, the seller "shall not thereafter be liable to the
original buyer upon the contract to sell or the sale or for any profit made by such
resale." UNIFORM SALES Acr § 60.
20. "The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit made on any
resale." U.C.C. § 2-706(6).
21. "Any sum remaining after the satisfaction of [the expenses of resale and the
underlying obligation] shall be paid to the buyer." UNIFORM CONDmONAL SAMs ACr §
21. The reason this section only refers to the buyer's rights is that, under the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, the secured party's interest in the goods was not discharged by
the disposition. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.8; U.C.C. § 9-504, Comment 2.
The same rule concerning excess proceeds applied to other kinds of pre-Code security
interests. E.g., UNIFORM TRUST REcEiPS Acr § 6.
22. After paying the expenses of the resale and the underlying obligation, the
proceeds are to be applied to "the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordi-
nate security interest in the collateral," and "the secured party must account to the
debtor for any surplus." U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(c), (2).
19791
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The Right to Force Resale
Article 2 gives the seller no explicit right to retain the
goods. 3 If the goods would not produce a surplus when resold,
however, the relative interests of M and W are not affected by
retention. In such a case, section 2-708 would apply to deter-
mine M's damages, which would be fixed at the contract price
minus the market price. 4 If the goods are worth more than the
contract price, M is entitled to retain the profits from resale but
recovers no damages. Thus, M and W are in exactly the same
position whether M retains the goods or whether the goods are
resold.
Under Article 9, with one exception,25 the seller is explic-
itly allowed to retain the goods in satisfaction of the obliga-
tion." In order to exercise this right, however, M must notify
W, and possibly L, if L had given M notice of its rights in the
goods. Both W and L then have the right to object to M's
retention of the goods, and M may be forced to resell. Because
M's retention of the goods satisfies any obligations owed by W
and extinguishes any rights held in the goods by L, resale will
only be forced in the event the goods are worth more than the
expenses of sale and the amount of M's obligation. Thus, the
buyer's and subordinate secured party's right to force sale
under section 9-505 is a means to protect their interests where
the value of the goods exceeds the contract price.
The Right to Notice
The buyer is entitled to notice under Article 2 if the seller
resells the goods, whether in a public or private sale.27 This
23. Such a right can be implied, however, from the language of § 2-702(3), which
states that repossession by the seller pursuant to that section is its exclusive remedy,
and by § 2-703(f), which gives the seller the right to cancel upon buyer's breach.
24. U.C.C. § 2-708(1). This section may also be available to determine damages
even though the goods have been resold. Compare Peters, Remedies for Breach of
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 260-61 (1963) with J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 223-24 (1972). For
our purposes, both § 2-706 and § 2-708 provide the same measure of damages, because
the resale price is assumed to be equal to the market price.
25. The only exception to the secured-party seller's right to retain under § 9-505
is in the case of consumer goods when the buyer-debtor has paid at least 60% of the
cash price. This exception is to protect the installment buyer who has built up a
substantial equity in the goods prior to default. See U.C.C. § 9-505, Comment 1.
26. U.C.C. § 9-505(2). See Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings
Under the UCC, 47 MINN. L. REv. 205, 215-16 (1962).
27. U.C.C. § 2-706(3), (4). The only exception to the buyer's right to notice under
that section is if the goods are to be sold at a public sale and "are perishable or threaten
[Vol. 19
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right to notice, although limited, is to protect the buyer from
improper conduct by the seller on resale. Because M is entitled
to recover a deficiency from W after the resale, W has the right
to notice to ensure that the goods are sold for their full value.n
No other parties are entitled to notice under Article 2."
Article 9, on the other hand, provides for notice to both W
and L, provided that L has given M written notice of its
claimed interest in the goods." Such notice protects both W's
and L's interests in the excess proceeds over the obligation
owed to M, and once again allows W to minimize its deficiency
obligation ."'
The Right to Redemption
The final way in which the parties' rights are different
under the two Articles is in the right to redemption. Under
Article 2, neither the buyer, nor anyone else, has a right to
redeem the goods from the seller's possession . 2 Therefore, if the
goods are worth more than the obligation owed to M, W is not
liable for a deficiency judgment but has no right to regain
possession of the goods merely by paying the contract price.
Under Article 9, because of the differing rights to the pro-
ceeds, both buyers and subordinate security interests have the
right to redeem the collateral by tendering the amount of the
obligation owed to the seller plus any expenses incurred by the
seller due to the default." If the goods are worth more than the
contract price, both W and L benefit by exercising such re-
demption rights: W by retaining the benefit of its sales contract
with M, and L by application of that excess in value to its own
secured interest.' Thus, these redemption rights are seen once
to decline in value speedily." Id. § 2-706(4)(b). With a private sale under such circum-
stances, the buyer is not entitled to notice of the time or place of the resale. See id. §
2-706, Comment 8.
28. The buyer is entitled to "reasonable notice of the time and place of a public
resale so that he may have an opportunity to bid or to secure the attendance of other
bidders." Id. § 2-706, Comment 8.
29. This omission probably occurred because the drafters did not recognize the
problem, but it could imply that no one else has an interest in the resale of the goods,
including any profit made on resale.
30. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1962 version).
31. Such notice is given so that "persons entitled to receive it will have sufficient
time to take appropriate steps to protect their interests by taking part in the sale or
other disposition if they so desire." U.C.C. § 9-504, Comment 6.
32. In fact, the seller has the right to cancel the contract after buyer's breach.
Id. § 2-703(f).
33. Id. § 9-506. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 237.
34. When the goods are worth more than the contract price, it is clearly better
19791
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again as intimately related to the parties' relative interests in
the surplus on resale of the goods.
Summary
There are other minor differences between the resale provi-
sions of Articles 2 and 9. The method of resale, for example, is
much more specifically set forth in Article 2.11 The rights set
forth above, however, are the most important differences be-
tween the two Articles. It is clear that the differences between
the seller's right to resell under Article 2 or Article 9 will only
be of practical significance if the goods have risen in value
above the contract price.36 If the goods are worth less than the
contract price, the right to excess proceeds, and its accompany-
ing rights to force sale, to notice, or to redeem, are of no import-
ance; W is subject to a deficiency judgment under either Arti-
cle, 7 and L's interest in the goods is of no value.38 In a rising
to redeem the goods than to let the seller retain them. It is not so clear, however,
whether W's and L's interest would be better served by redeeming the goods or by
forcing resale and claiming the excess proceeds. Two factors argue in favor of redemp-
tion being the preferable action. First, redemption minimizes the expenses incurred
in resale that are added to M's underlying obligation. More importantly, however, the
goods are probably worth more to W than M would receive on resale.
35. Section 2-706(4) sets forth several specific rules for disposition by a public
sale, while § 9-504(3) requires only commercial reasonableness. The commercially
reasonable standard underlies both provisions, however; see U.C.C. § 2-706, Comment
2; id. § 9-504, Comment 1; and the differences in specificity are best explained as
caused by the greater amount of common law antecedents to § 2-706, making the
"commercially reasonable" practices more clear. For more extended discussions of the
seller's default rights under Articles 2 and 9, see Hogan, supra note 26; Nordstrom,
Seller's Damages Following Resale Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
65 MICH. L. REv. 1299 (1967).
36. This significantly diminishes the importance of the conflict. After all, buyers
with a profitable contract do not normally breach. Such cases are found, however,
either because the buyer had no alternative but to breach, or because the issue of which
party was actually in default was not resolved until trial. Nordstrom, supra note 35,
at 1301; see Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1953); see also J. DAWSON & G. PALMER, CASES ON RESTIuTrION 550-58 (2d ed.
1969).
Article 9 is more likely to produce a surplus on resale than prior law. Because of
the restrictions on resale, pre-Code law turned the surplus to be returned to the debtor
into a "glittering mirage." 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 9, § 43.2, at 1188. In particular,
referring to the antecedent statute most relevant herein, Professor Gilmore stated that
"[iut may be that a [Uniform Conditional Sales Act] sale has produced a surplus to
be handed over to the buyer, but the phenomenon has never been documented:" Id. §
44.4, at 1227. Under the commercial reasonableness standard of the Code, disposition
of the goods should yield a higher price, and a greater possibility of a surplus after the
seller's obligation has been paid.
37. U.C.C. §§ 2-706(1), 9-504(2).
38. We have assumed throughout that M has priority in the goods, and that
interest would take all the proceeds of resale.
U. C.C. DEFAULT RIGHTS
market situation, however, the conflict between the parties
over which Article would apply could be of great importance.
M will argue for Article 2 and the unfettered benefits it gives
to the seller, while Wand L will claim the more extensive rights
given them under Article 9. Therefore, it is worthwhile to focus
on the resolution of that conflict.
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTING RESALE RIGHTS UNDER
ARTICLES 2 AND 9 -
In resolving the conflict, it is helpful to examine first the
historical treatment of the seller's and the conditional seller's
rights to profits on resale, in an attempt to gain insight into
those situations which would require a similar treatment
today. Next, those factual elements that initially appear most
critical to resolution of the conflict under the Code will be
analyzed. These include whether the seller has taken an Article
9 security interest and whether the goods have been delivered.
Finally, three important factual constructs will be explored,
and the Code's text, Comments, and policy will be applied to
resolve the issue of conflicting resale rights.
The Historical Antecedents to Differing Rights Under Articles
2 and 9
The U.C.C. did not arise entirely from Karl Llewellyn's
imagination." Rather, it was built on the accumulated wisdom
of the common law and prior uniform acts. Article 2, in particu-
lar, is a direct descendant of the Uniform Sales Act. While the
Article 2 framework differs from that Act, particularly in its
diminution of the importance of title,'" the same result is
reached in almost all cases under the two statutes." Article 9
is a more drastic change from prior law. Most of the change
comes from an amalgamation into one Article of the multitude
of various security interests that previously existed. 2 The Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act, the antecedent statute most rele-
39. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 754. "Although Article Nine
is the most innovative of all the Code articles, it did not spring full grown from the
forehead of Grant Gilmore or Allison Dunham, or even Karl Llewellyn." Id.
40. See U.C.C. § 2-401; Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales: Should
It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 826-27 (1950). Article 9 also rejects the importance
of title to the resolution of disputes. See U.C.C. § 9-202.
41. See Cudahy, Samuel Williston: The Uniform Commercial Code and the Prior
Law of Sales-Seamless or Tangled Web, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 451, 453 (1963).
42. See 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.1, at 288
(1965).
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vant to the present problem, was carried over fairly completely,
at least in result, to the resale provisions in Article 9.43 A look
at how the differing treatment of sellers and conditional sellers
came about is beneficial."
The pre-Code ancestor of the secured party seller under
Article 9 was the conditional seller, who retained title to the
goods to secure payment after delivery to the buyer." At com-
mon law, the conditional seller was caught in a tension between
two differing remedies." The conditional seller could sue on the
debt, in which case any right against the goods was extin-
guished. The alternative was to repossess the goods, and al-
though the conditional vendor was entitled to retain any sur-
plus on resale, no deficiency judgment would be rendered if
disposition on resale produced less than the amount of the
underlying obligation. This forced election was thought to im-
pose hardship on both parties to the transaction. The condi-
tional seller was compelled to choose between the personal obli-
gation of the buyer and the security of the goods, although both
could be necessary to ensure payment of the underlying debt.
The buyer was denied protection for any equity interest that
might have developed in the goods."7 The Uniform Conditional
Sales Act resolved this tension in the same fashion as Article
9. The conditional seller could repossess the goods, resell them,
and collect a deficiency judgment, but any surplus after resale
belonged to the buyer."
In contrast to the conditional seller, a seller who did not
retain a security interest was always able to retain any excess
profits on resale. In the 1852 case of Warren v. Buckminster,"
a contract was formed for the sale of fifteen sheep. On default
by the buyer, the seller resold the sheep to a third party for an
amount exceeding the buyer's obligation. Because the buyer
had paid part of the obligation in advance, he sued to recover
43. See UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES Acr §§ 18-23.
44. See Hogan, Book Review, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 282, 284 (1966) (on the import-
ance of historical background to understanding the Code, particularly Article 9).
45. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES Acr § 1; 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 9, §§ 3.1-.8,
at 62-85; 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 18, § 579, at 224-25.
46. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 9, § 43.1, at 1182; 3 S. WILLSTON, supra note
18, § 579b, at 227-28; Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 542-
43 (1948).
47. See 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 18, § 579d, at 232.
48. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 21. "Any sum remaining after the satisfac-
tion of [the expenses of resale and the underlying obligation] shall be paid to the
buyer." Id. See 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 18, § 579d, at 234; Gilmore & Axelrod, supra
note 46, at 547.
49. 24 N.H. 336 (1852).
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on a count for money had and received. The court held for the
seller, stating that because the goods had not been delivered,
and because the sheep to be purchased had not even been
selected, the buyer had no property interest in the sheep. Since
a property interest in the goods was a necessary element for the
buyer to recover in the action, the seller could retain any profits
from the resale as his ownY° The Uniform Sales Act continued
this seller's right to excess profits in section 60, 51 and section
2-706 of the U.C.C. is a direct descendant of that provision.
The rationale behind these different rules has never been
totally clear. Williston, in his treatise on sales, attempts to
justify the difference, but his reasoning is unconvincing." Two
distinctions between a conditional seller and an unsecured
seller provide the best explanation for the uniform act results
and give some insight into the resolution of the comparable
U.C.C. conflict. First, the concept of title was very important
in both the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act. The conditional seller, while retaining title to the
goods in form, had passed dominion over the goods to the
buyer. The seller's title was thus viewed as a mere security
50. Id. at 342-44. For a similar result in a contract for the sale of cattle, see
Bridgford v. Crocker, 60 N.Y. 627 (1875).
51. After resale of the goods, the seller "shall not thereafter be liable to the
original buyer upon the contract to sell or the sale or for any profit made by such
resale." UNIFORM SALs AcT § 60(1).
52. Williston suggests two arguments why the seller is able to retain any profit
made on resale. First, he argues that, by reselling, the seller is acting not as the buyer's
agent, but on his own behalf pursuant to authority given by law. Therefore, the seller
is entitled to retain any profit made on the resale. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 18, §
553, at 178. Williston provides his own answer to this argument, however, by stating
that the mortgagee (or conditional seller) also resells by authority of law; nevertheless,
that resale is on buyer's account, with the buyer entitled to any profit on resale. Id. at
179. There is no necessary relationship between the legal power to resell and the right
to retain profits.
The second argument is that the conditional seller is entitled to retake the goods
and keep any payments made. Therefore, since the seller with a seller's lien is function-
ally equivalent to a conditional seller, the seller should be able to retain any surplus
from resale. Id. at 179-80. This argument ignores the other half of the conditional
seller's rights. Once the conditional seller has retaken the goods and retains payments,
the conditional seller would no longer be entitled to a deficiency judgment. See text
accompanying note 46 supra. To give a seller both the right to retain the surplus and
the right to a deficiency judgment is to grant such a seller with a seller's lien the benefit
of equivalency to a conditional seller without any of its burdens.
The fundamental problem is, as Williston states, that the sale with a lien is
indistinguishable from a conditional sale in which the buyer has retained title to secure
payment. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 18, § 553, at 180. Despite this functional equality,
the rights of sellers in either category developed along different lines, with the result
that profits on resale belonged to the seller under one label, and to the buyer under
the other.
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title to ensure payment of the underlying debt. 3 Since the
amount of that debt set the value of the conditional seller's
interest, any excess proceeds over that amount were traceable
to the property interest of the buyer.54 The unsecured seller,
on the other hand, had a right to resell the goods only if it still
had a seller's lien on the goods, as provided by the Uniform
Sales Act.55 Under such a lien the seller's interest was in the
goods, not merely in the underlying debt, and the seller was
entitled to all the proceeds of resale, even where such proceeds
created a profit.5"
The scope of the seller's lien under the Uniform Sales Act
provides a second instructive distinction. Once the goods were
delivered to the buyer, the seller's lien was extinguished.57
Thereafter, the seller was generally entitled only to an action
on the personal obligation," and any increase in the value of
the goods would accrue to the buyer's benefit. After delivery,
the seller's interest was equivalent to that of a conditional
seller, absent the security interest. The conditional seller had
the right to reclaim the goods after delivery to the buyer,56 but
any excess profits on resale would still be the property of the
conditional vendee.6 0 This importance of delivery in deter-
mining the right to excess proceeds is carried over into the
provisions of the U.C.C.
U C. C. Treatment of the Rights to Excess Profits
The rather metaphysical reliance on title of the earlier
uniform acts was the theoretical underpinning of the differing
treatment given the seller and the conditional seller concerning
their right to profits on resale of the goods after the buyer's
breach. In application, however, this metaphysics provided a
fairly clear dividing line at the point when the goods were deliv-
ered to the buyer. The Code, in contrast, relies almost totally
on factual determinants. Rights and duties are allocated based
53. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 18, § 579, at 225.
54. "The beneficial interest in the property, so far as is not inconsistent with the
security of the seller, is vested in the buyer." Id.
55. "[An unpaid seller having a right of lien . . . may resell the goods."
UNIFORM SALES AcT § 60(1).
56. "The unpaid seller of goods, as such, has a lien on the goods . UNIFORM
SALmS AcT § 53(1)(a) (emphasis added). There is no doubt that the distinction de-
scribed in the text is entirely formalistic. As even Williston recognized, the seller's lien
and the interest of a conditional seller were almost indistinguishable, but the labelling
process went on nevertheless. See note 52 supra.
57. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 56(1)(b).
58. Gilmore & Axelrod, supra note 46, at 519 n.4.
59. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT §§ 16-17.
60. Id. § 21.
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not on title, but rather on possession and on where the conflict
falls within the framework of the commercial transaction." It
is consistent with the underlying approach of the Code, there-
fore, to structure the resolution of this default conflict around
factual signposts. Two of these signposts are most important.
One concerns the existence of a consensual Article 9 security
interest; the other concerns delivery.
The existence of an Article 9 interest in the seller would
appear at first glance to determine the applicable rules on re-
sale. If the seller has such an interest, then the Article 9 rules
would apply, and the other secured parties and the buyer
would be entitled to the excess profits on resale. However, the
seller with an Article 9 security interest is an Article 2 seller as
well. There is nothing in the Code that expressly denies Article
2 rights where the seller has taken an Article 9 interest; in fact,
the opposite result is implied."2 Conversely, the Article 2 seller,
without regard to an Article 9 interest, can be seen as having a
"security interest" conferred by Article 2 to withhold the
goods, 3 or to stop them in transit," and to resell them. 5 Each
of those rights seems to be "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion"-the definition of security interest."6 Section 9-113 ex-
pressly recognizes this fact by making Article 9 applicable, in
certain circumstances, to a "security interest arising solely
under the Article on Sales (Article 2)."17 Moreover, Article 2
itself gives rights to secured parties as "purchasers" under sec-
tion 2-403, and those rights explicitly include Article 9 rights."
The secured third party lender can argue convincingly that the
seller's rights on resale under Article 2 should be limited by the
61. See Corbin, supra note 40, at 835; Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 912.
62. U.C.C. § 9-113, Comment 5. In addition, it would seem odd that a seller
taking a consensual Article 9 interest to increase its protection should be worse off in
its rights to any increased value of the goods.
63. U.C.C. § 2-703(a).
64. Id. § 2-705.
65. Id. § 2-706.
66. Id. § 1-201(37).
67. Before the buyer gains possession of the goods, § 9-113 states that such
Article 2 security interests need not comply with the Article 9 requirements of a
security agreement and filing to perfect the interest, and that the Article 2 default
rights apply on any default. After delivery, however, the transaction is subject to
Article 9. See P. COOGAN, W. HoGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.07(2), at 314.3 n.51 (1963); Weingarten, Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Definitions and Rules of General Application, 9 WAYNE L.
REv. 537, 553-54 (1963).
68. U.C.C. § 2-403(4). Secured parties come within the definition of purchasers
as given by U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33).
19791
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
rights given to secured parties by Article 9. These conflicts,
explored more fully below, make clear that the conflict between
Article 2 and Article 9 default rights can never be resolved
solely by a factual determination that the seller has or has not
taken a consensual security interest.
A second factual determination, important in resolving
this problem, is whether the goods have been delivered to the
buyer. Under the earlier uniform acts, this question was almost
inseparable from whether the seller had a security interest. The
conditional seller, after all, only became a conditional seller
once the goods were delivered to the buyer." Under the U.C.C.,
however, an Article 9 security interest attaches when "the
debtor has rights in the collateral."7I This phrase, like so many
others in the Code, has a less than clear meaning. It may be
that the debtor-buyer has rights in the collateral at the time
the goods are identified to the contract in the seller's ware-
house.7 Alternatively, such rights may not arise until the time
the goods are delivered to the carrier for shipment.12 In any
case, the buyer almost certainly has rights in the collateral
prior to receiving the goods, so the seller's security interest, and
those of third parties, can attach prior to delivery."
69. Section 1 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act evidences this fact. A condi-
tional sale was defined to mean "any contract for the sale of goods under which
possession is delivered to the 6uyer and the property in the goods is to vest in the buyer
at a subsequent time upon the payment of part or all of the price, or upon the perform-
ance of any other condition or the happening of any contingency." (emphasis added).
Presumably, prior to delivery the seller would have relied on the seller's lien given by
UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ 54-56.
70. Under Article 9, there are three requisites to attachment of a security inter-
est. There must be a written security agreement adequately describing the collateral,
the secured party must have given value, and the debtor must have rights in the
collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203(1). To perfect the interest, there must also have been a filing
of a financing statement.
71. Section 2-501(1) provides that the buyer gains a special property interest in
the goods at the time they are identified to the contract. Whether this special property
intereat is sufficient to give the buyer rights in the collateral for purposes of attachment
of the seller's security interest is unclear. See note 73 infra.
72. For an F.O.B. shipment contract, U.C.C. § 2-319(1)(a), the risk of loss
passes to the buyer on delivery of goods to a carrier. U.C.C. § 2-509(1)(a). Passing the
risk of loss to the buyer almost certainly gives it rights in the collateral for Article 9
attachment purposes. See U.C.C. § 2-401(2)(a).
73. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 42, § 11.5, at 353 (rights in the collateral when
buyer gets a special property interest under § 2-501 on identification of the goods to
the contract); Hogan, supra note 6, at 577 (rights in the collateral when buyer has the
power to transfer the goods; the buyer has the power to transfer the goods; the buyer
certainly has such power after title has passed on delivery of goods to the carrier under
an F.O.B. shipment contract). Contra, Anzivino, When Does a Debtor Have Rights in
the Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 61 MARQ. L. REv.
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However, delivery is still important in the Code frame-
work.74 Section 9-113, which makes Article 9 applicable to Arti-
cle 2 security interests, states that Article 9 is not fully applica-
ble until the buyer has or has lawfully obtained possession of
the goods.75 This is particularly important to resolution of the
proceeds problem, because one of the Article 9 provisions that
does not apply under section 9-113 prior to delivery is the rights
of the seller on default by the buyer. In addition, Article 2
emphasizes the critical importance of delivery in the right to
excess proceeds on resale. In order to resell the goods, the seller
must have possession of them. Article 2 explicitly gives the
seller the right, after default by the buyer, to withhold the
goods or to recover them while in transit.7 Once the goods have
been delivered to the buyer, however, Article 2 gives the unse-
cured seller no general right to repossess the goods in order to
resell them.78 The seller is left, as under the Uniform Sales Act,
with only the right to sue on the personal obligation of the
buyer for the underlying debt. Any rights to reclaim must be
found in either the contractual agreement between the buyer
and the seller, the special rights given in cases of buyer fraud
by Article 2,'7 the common law notions of replevin as incorpo-
rated by section 1-103,1° or an explicit Article 9 security interest
taken by the seller.' Delivery is thus vitally important, at least
for Article 2 purposes, to secured parties or buyers who claim
23, 44-52 (1977) (buyer has no rights in the collateral until it gains possession of the
goods).
74. "For both Article 2 and Article 9, physical location of contract goods is a
significant indicator of statutory rights, particularly when third-party interests are at
stake." Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 912. The conclusions drawn by Professors
Jackson and Peters as to the relative rights of the unsecured seller, the buyer, and
various third parties reflect the critical importance of delivery.
75. See note 67 supra.
76. U.C.C. § 9-113(c) states that, after the debtor obtains possession of the goods,
"the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by the Article
on Sales (Article 2)." On its face, this provision says nothing about the rights of third
parties, however. See note 106 infra.
77. U.C.C. §§ 2-703(a), 2-705.
78. Only the buyer is given a general right to replevin under Article 2.U.C.C. §
2-716(3) gives that right when the goods are identified to the contract and the buyer
is unable to cover.
79. U.C.C. §§ 2-507 (cash sale), 2-702(2) (credit sale).
80. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides that rights under state law continue under the Code,
unless displaced by specific Code provisions. A seller could argue from the lack of any
general right to reclaim in Article 2 that it could utilize any such rights available under
non-Code state law. See note 84 infra.
81. If an Article 9 interest has been taken by the seller, § 9-503 grants the seller
the right to repossess the goods.
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a right to the excess value of the goods over the amount of the
underlying obligation.
Having provided the necessary historical and Code intro-
duction, it is possible to resolve the fundamental issue: in
which factual circumstances do the Article 2 and Article 9 de-
fault rules apply? 2
Three Relevant Factual Patterns
In keeping with the U.C.C.'s emphasis on resolution of
issues by factual, rather than metaphysical determinations,
this section proposes factual solutions to the problem of which
default rules should apply when the seller has priority in the
goods. The easiest case, when the goods have been delivered to
the buyer, is considered first. With one exception, Article 9
default rules should apply, giving buyers and secured parties
the right to any excess proceeds after resale of the goods and
satisfaction of the underlying obligation. The next two situa-
tions involve the more difficult pre-delivery problems-cases in
which the seller has not taken an explicit Article 9 security
interest and cases in which such an interest has been taken.
Recognizing the less than clear statutory meaning and the
more difficult policy issues, it is concluded that whether the
seller has taken a consensual security interest should make no
difference. At all times prior to delivery of goods to the buyer,
the seller should be able to utilize the Article 2 rights and retain
any profits on resale.
It is worthwhile to reintroduce the relevant parties in the
conflict, because they will.be the focus of the analysis to follow.
M, the manufacturer of television sets and the seller involved
in the transaction, may or may not have taken an Article 9
security interest in the goods. W, the wholesaler of such goods,
has agreed to buy one hundred television sets from M, and will
also be an Article 9 debtor if M has taken a consensual security
interest. W is also a debtor in relation to L, the secured party
82. Although the analysis is couched in terms of which resale rights apply, the
rights given to W and L are worthless without some way to vindicate their interests.
Section 9-507 provides the protection needed, however. Under that provision, if Article
9 applied, W or L would be entitled to recover from M any damages incurred due to
M's noncompliance with Article 9 default rules. If the goods have been resold for an
amount greater than was necessary to satisfy the obligation owed to M, then L and W
could sue under § 9-507 to recover the excess proceeds. Under certain circumstances,
L or W could recover a greater amount if, for example, either could show it would have
redeemed the goods, thus saving the expenses of resale and gaining the benefits of any
continued increase in value. For a discussion of problems under § 9-507, see 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.9, at 1252.
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bank that loaned money to W and took a security interest in
"all personal property of W, wherever it may be found." For
purposes of simplicity, M will always be referred to as the seller
and W as the buyer; the context will make clear their roles as
either secured party or debtor. L is always referred to as the
third party secured lender. It is also assumed throughout that
M has priority over L in the right to satisfy its obligation from
the goods. 3
After delivery of the goods to W. Assume the television sets
were delivered to W, who refused to pay, thus breaching the
contract. Because of a rising market situation, M would like to
83. This assumption is not critical to the conflict over default rights. If L has
priority, Article 9 default rules apply, because L can only get priority through the
application of Article 9. However, L cannot get priority until the goods have been
delivered to W, so the resulting application of Article 9 default rules is consistent with
the dividing line drawn by this article. The priority question is more important with
regard to whether M should take an Article 9 security interest to protect its interest.
Because its priority rights as against other secured parties are uncertain, taking an
Article 9 interest might be the optimal course of action.
The conflict is between L, an Article 9 secured party, and M, a seller with either
a security interest solely under Article 2 or a consensual interest covered by Article 9.
All such conflicts are governed by Article 9. If M has only an Article 2 security interest,
then Article 9 applies because priority problems are conspicuously absent from the
coverage of § 9-113. If M has an Article 9 interest, then the Article 9 provisions are
applicable a fortiori. Because M is a purchase money secured party (see U.C.C. § 9-
107), § 9-312 applies to determine its priority relative to L. Before delivery of the goods
to W, M has priority over all other security interests in the goods. U.C.C. § 9-312(3),
(4). Those provisions do not explicitly cover the case in which the goods have not been
delivered to the buyer, but the necessary implication from the special protection they
grant to purchase money security interests after delivery is that such interests have
priority before delivery as well. See Hogan, supra note 6, at 583-85.
The post-delivery case is more complicated. Because the goods involved are inven-
tory, M has to meet the requirements of § 9-312(3) to establish priority over L. That
provision requires that the purchase money security interest be perfected at the time
the buyer gains possession of the goods. Where M has taken an Article 9 interest, we
have assumed that the interest has been perfected, so that M has priority. If M has
an Article 2 security interest, however, it would be subordinate to L's interest. An
Article 2 security interest is perfected without filing until W gains possession of the
goods. U.C.C. § 9-113(b). That perfection is lost upon delivery, and unless W has filed
its Article 2 interest (a very unlikely prospect), its failure to meet the requirement of
§ 9-312(3)(a) gives L priority. If M meets the "perfection when the debtor receives
possession" requirement, then it still must comply with the notice requirements of §
9-312(3)(b), (c), and (d) to ensure its priority position. For goods other than inventory,
the same analysis would apply, except that M has 10 days after W gains possession to
file and perfect its interest (still an unlikely prospect for a security interest solely under
Article 2), and the notice requirements would be absent. U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
Therefore, it seems that the only time M would not have priority in the goods as
against the after-acquired property interest held by L is after delivery when M is
without an Article 9 interest. For more extended treatments of the priority problems
facing unsecured sellers, see Hogan, supra note 6, at 575-89; Jackson & Peters, supra
note 6, at 947-83. Given the uncertain resolution of such interests, M would always
benefit from taking an Article 9 interest.
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reclaim the sets and resell them, keeping the profits on resale
for its own account. W, on the other hand, has had a change of
heart. It recognizes that it made a good deal in its contract with
M, and wants to retain those benefits by redeeming the goods
if M repossesses them. L also has an interest in the rising mar-
ket price. W has defaulted on its payments to L, and L would
like to use any profit from resale to satisfy at least part of the
loan obligation. Which set of default rules will apply?
The Article 9 default rules should apply after delivery un-
less the seller is able to reclaim the goods pursuant to section
2-702(2), which gives the seller special rights on insolvency by
the buyer. This should be the result whether M has taken an
Article 9 security interest or not. If M has not taken such an
interest, them M cannot use Article 9 repossession rights. Arti-
cle 2 gives no general right to repossess the goods after buyer's
default. Therefore, the goods remain in W's possession, and the
right to the value of the goods in excess of the contract price
goes to W and L-an Article 9 result.
In some circumstances, M could reclaim the goods by vir-
tue of rights conferred by the contract with W, rights under
state law incorporated by section 1-103,11 or rights on W's insol-
vency under section 2-702(2). Leaving aside the section 2-
702(2) right, the other rights, even if they allowed M to regain
possession of the goods, would not allow M to retain the benefit
of any increased value in the goods. If M has repossessed the
goods pursuant to a state-created or contractual right, it can
not claim to be reselling pursuant to section 2-706 and retain
the excess profits on resale; section 9-113 forecloses that possi-
bility. The right to resell as given by section 2-706 is apparently
a security interest arising solely under Article 2,8 and W had
84. It is not totally clear that such state law rights are still available by incorpo-
ration through § 1-103. Section 2-702(2) seems to exclude at least some of the seller's
state law rights in goods after delivery to the buyer. Such rights can be divided into
two categories. On the one hand are state law rights that grant the seller repossession
rights because of some fraudulent conduct by the buyer that allowed it to gain posses-
sion of the goods. See, e.g., Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 269 Minn.
127, 130 N.W.2d 69 (1964). Such rights are included in the Code in a revised form in §
2-507 and § 2-702, and thus are probably barred from incorporation pursuant to § 1-
103 because of § 2-702(2). On the other hand, there are also state statutes that grant
sellers special interests in the goods after delivery because of the nature of the goods.
See Gilmore & Axelrod, supra note 46, at 524 n.17. Although no such special rights
would apply to the televisions involved in these facts, a state law right based on the
nature of the goods would not be barred by § 2-702(2).
85. It is unclear what rights are covered by the phrase "security interest arising
solely under the Article on Sales." Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-113 confuses the issue by
stating that "the use of the term 'security interest' in the Sales Article is meant to bring
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lawfully obtained possession of the goods. Given these two con-
ditions, section 9-113 expressly states that Article 9 applies to
the transaction, thus giving W and L the benefit of any profits
on resale. If M does not resell, but rather retains the goods for
its own use, W and L are still entitled to Article 9's default
provisions. M could argue that the repossession was not by
virtue of an Article 2 security interest, and thus section 9-113
should not bring Article 9's provisions into play. Such a result
would be anomalous. Delivery of goods to the buyer is the
paradigm case in which the third party secured lender ac-
tually relies on those goods to ensure at least partial payment
of its obligation;" and Article 2's omission of a general right to
repossess coupled with section 9-113's focus on delivery make
clear the Code's policy of fully protecting the buyer's interest
after delivery of the goods. In light of such an anomaly, a court
faced with the issue should be receptive to the exercise by W
or L of their Article 9 rights in the face of retention of the goods
by M.
Under a contractual right to reclaim, M's right to repossess
the interests so designated within this Article." Unfortunately, that term is not used
in Article 2 in reference to those rights that Comment 1 implies are such "security
interests under Article 2." This is probably a result of a lack of communication between
the drafters of the two articles, however, and Comment l's reference to the right of
resale as "similar to the rights of a secured party" implies that § 2-706 creates an
Article 2 security interest within the meaning of § 9-113. This conclusion is fortified
by the definition of "security interest," that is "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
The right to sell the goods and apply the proceeds to the buyer's obligation certainly
appears to be an interest that "secures payment" as the words are used in this section.
See Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 921 n.59.
The issue is not totally clear, however. Professor Gilmore limits "security interest
under Article 2" to the unpaid seller's lien on goods in its possession and the seller's
security title in goods shipped under a bill of lading or shipment term that postpones
the passage of title until the goods arrive at their destination. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note
42, § 11.3, at 341-42. This clearly seems too narrow, given the broad Code definition
of "security interest" and Comment l's explicit reference to the rights of resale and of
stoppage-in-transit, which are available without regard to whether the seller has re-
served title in the goods. It is possible, however, that Comment 1 is not referring to
the § 2-706 right to resell as a security interest; rather, it is stating that the seller's
Article 2 rights to withhold the goods or stop them in transit, and then to resell them
are a security interest when used in conjunction with one another. Such an interpreta-
tion would more closely fit the § 1-201(37) definition. That interpretation would not
change the analysis here, however, because it is argued that an unsecured seller's using
any means other than § 2-702 to reclaim the goods from the buyer would be subject to
Article 9 default provisions without regard to § 2-706.
86. On the importance of delivery to the buyer to show reliance on the part of
the secured party, see McDonnell, supra note 5, at 455 ("If, in fact, the financier is
making credit decisions on the basis of new assets, reliance would not be difficult to
document.").
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is not a security interest arising solely under Article 2, but is
arguably a security interest directly under Article 9. Such a
right meets the section 1-201(37) definition. Therefore, al-
though section 9-113 would not apply, the remainder of Article
9 would,88 giving W and L their default rights. 9
Under a state-created reclamation right, a court could
read section 9-113 broadly to cover security interests "arising
by action of law in connection with a sales transaction."90 This
interpretation makes M's state-created repossession right sub-
ject to section 9-113 since W had lawfully obtained possession.
Under the interpretation, W and L have Article 9 rights after
repossession of the goods by M pursuant to a state-created or
contractual right. Therefore, in a rising market situation they
could force M to dispose of the goods under section 9-505 and
take the profits on resale under section 9-504, or they could
redeem the goods under section 9-506 to retain the increased
value for themselves. Given judicial acceptance of the above
interpretations, the unsecured seller would almost always lose
its Article 2 right to any excess proceeds on resale once the
goods have been delivered to the buyer.
The only exception to that result is in section 2-702(2),
which provides that if M discovers that W has received the
goods on credit while insolvent, M may reclaim the goods by
making demand on W within ten days after delivery." After
87. A contractual right to reclaim is clearly "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
Section 2-401(1) is also on point: "Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title
(property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation
of a security interest:"
88. "[Article 9 applies] to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is
intended to create a security interest in personal property ... " U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a).
89. This argument does not encompass any rights to reclaim granted by state
law. Although such rights seem to come within the definition of "security interest"
given by § 1-201(37), Judge Braucher has persuasively argued that § 9-102 only makes
Article 9 applicable to consensual security interests created by contract. Braucher,
Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1281, 1290 (1967).
Section 9-113 provides an alternate route into Article 9, however (see Jackson & Peters,
supra note 6, at 927-28), and state rights are made subject to Article 9 by that provi-
sion.
90. As stated before, § 9-113 is unclear on the coverage of the term "security
interest arising solely under the Article on Sales." See note 85 supra. The broad
definition argued for in this article is supported by Comment 2 to § 9-113 ("The
security interests to which this Section applies commonly arise by operation of law in
the course of a sales transaction."), and Professor Gilmore. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note
42, § 19.7, at 539.
91. "Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
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exercise of that right, M is not allowed to collect a deficiency
judgment, but is allowed to retain any profit made on resale;"
W or L should not be able to overturn this result. The special
right to reclaim given by this section is a security interest aris-
ing solely under Article 2,11 but in such a case the buyer has
not lawfully obtained possession of the goods." Section 9-113
therefore prescribes that default rights will be determined
under Article 2, and W clearly has no right to any excess pro-
ceeds under that Article. L's rights are explicitly considered in
section 2-702(3), which refers to section 2-403 for resolution of
conflicts between the reclaiming seller and secured parties. As
discussed below,"5 L's rights under section 2-403 are not per-
fectly clear, but the assumption throughout has been that M
has priority in the goods." The result is perhaps best seen as a
balance of the two competing equities in a difficult situation.
On the one hand, the goods have been delivered to the buyer,
and secured parties could have actually relied on that fact in
extending credit to the buyer. On the other hand, the insol-
vency case sharply presents the situation in which the seller, if
not actually defrauded, has at least delivered goods to the
buyer under conditions approaching fraud. Section 2-702 recog-
nizes this conflict and resolves the issue by giving the seller the
right to repossession subject to the interests of those third par-
ties that are most entitled to protection. This conflict is re-
solved by the Code completely within the confines of Article 2,
and the parties' relative rights on default should be similarly
treated. 7
writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply."
U.C.C. § 2-702(2). For purposes of simplicity, it is assumed that no written representa-
tion of solvency has been given.
92. "Successful reclamation of goods [under § 2-702] excludes all other reme-
dies with respect to them." U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
93. The author accepts the validity of the argument made by Professors Jackson
and Peters that the § 2-702(2) right to reclaim is an Article 2 security interest, despite
Judge Braucher's contentions to the contrary. Compare Jackson & Peters, supra note
6, at 926-29, with Braucher, supra note 89, at 1290.
94. On this point, Professors Jackson and Peters agree with Judge Braucher.
Braucher, supra note 89, at 1290; Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 929-30. Each
reaches the conclusion that § 9-113 does not make Article 9 totally applicable to the
seller reclaiming the goods. pursuant to § 2-702(2). It is hard to imagine what the
"lawfully obtain possession" language in § 9-113 could apply to other than this quasi-
fraudulent purchase by the buyer (see U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 2) or a theft of the
goods. In the latter case, the seller has a conversion action and need not resort to the
Code's provisions.
95. See text accompanying notes 108-122 infra.
96. For a discussion of the validity of this assumption under § 2-403, see note
109 infra. For the corresponding Article 9 discussion, see note 83 supra.
97. One other Article 2 provision granting the seller rights to reclaim the goods
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If M has taken an Article 9 security interest, then the
results argued for above remain the same. In such a case, M
has the right to repossession after default under section 9-503,
but that right carries with it the interest of W and L given by
the other Article 9 default provisions. M should not be able to
argue for repossession by virtue of Article 9 and then for resale
or retention of the goods pursuant to Article 2. Similarly, the
taking of a consensual security interest should not foreclose M
from its rights under section 2-702(2), even though those rights
cut off the interests of W and L in any increased value of the
goods."
Before delivery to W, and M does not have an Article 9
security interest. Assume that the goods have not yet been
delivered to W. The contract called for the risk of loss to shift
to W once M delivered the goods to the carrier," and delivery
to the carrier has taken place. Once the goods were in transit,
W telephoned M and stated that it would refuse to take the
goods, thus breaching the contract.00 M wants to reclaim the
goods and resell them pursuant to its Article 2 default rights.
Once again, the parties are faced with a rising market situa-
tion, and both W and L would like to assert their Article 9
rights to gain the benefit of the increased value of the goods.
Close analysis of the problem leads to the conclusion that such
claims should not be allowed, and M should be able to retain
any profits on resale pursuant to section 2-706.
Contrary to the post-delivery situation, the Code's provi-
sions and policies imply that differing rights might be available
after delivery is § 2-507. This is the Code equivalent of the common law cash sale rule
(see. e.g., Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 269 Minn. 127, 130 N.W.2d
69 (1964)), just as § 2-702 is the Code descendant of the credit sale doctrine (see, e.g.,
California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933)). The two doctrines
gave essentially the same rights to reclaim to sellers under common law. See Gilmore,
The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1059-62 (1954).
Under the Code, this equivalence is made uncertain. This uncertainty is primarily
due to the drafting of § 2-507, which shows almost no awareness of § 2-702 or of the
relationship between the two rights. The 10-day limit on reclamation, for example, is
included only in Comment 3 to § 2-507. The § 2-507 right, at least as drafted, would
apply to grant M greater rights to reclaim than § 2-702(2). The sections have been
treated as equivalent for most purposes, however (see Jackson & Peters, supra note 6,
at 947 (default rights under Articles 2 and 9)), and an extended discussion of the
problems in harmonizing the two sections will not be attempted here.
98. See U.C.C. § 9-113, Comment 5.
99. Under § 2-319(1)(a), it is therefore an F.O.B. shipment contract, and the
buyer has rights in the collateral for purposes of attachment under § 9-203 of either
M's or L's consensual security interest. See U.C.C. § 2-401(2)(a).
100. Once again it can be asked why a buyer would breach in that situation. For
a discussion of that issue, see note 36 supra.
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to buyers and secured parties. Therefore, the analysis must be
separated into M's rights against W and M's rights against L.
M has an easier time repossessing the goods utilizing only
its Article 2 rights. Section 2-705 governs stoppage-in-transit,
and in a large commercial transaction, M has the right to re-
claim the goods from the possession of the carrier upon breach
by W'' Such reclamation brings section 9-113 back into the
picture, however, because the right to stoppage-in-transit by
an unsecured seller is a security interest arising solely under
Article 2.1"1 The goods had not yet been delivered to W, and in
such a situation section 9-113(c) explicitly states that default
rights are governed by Article 2. Section 2-706(6) gives a simple
answer: "The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any
profit made on any resale." Therefore, M can resell the goods
and the buyer has no right to any benefit from their increase
in value.'03
M's rights against L are more difficult to ascertain. L re-
ceived a security interest in the goods when M delivered them
to the carrier. At that point, W had rights in the collateral
because the risk of loss had passed; 04 L's security interest cov-
ered the goods because they were "personal property of W,"
and L's interest attached, assuming it had met the other re-
quirements of section 9-203.'1" That security interest is jeopard-
ized, however, by M's reclamation of the goods and intended
resale.
Section 9-113 itself affords little solace to L, because it
once again appears to push resolution of the parties' relative
default rights into Article 2, and L must look to that Article for
any rights against M. ,01 An argument can be made under Arti-
101. For purposes of a simple breach of contract, § 2-705(1) would allow M to
reclaim the goods so long as 100 television sets are at least a truckload shipment. For
smaller shipments, W must be insolvent for M to exercise stoppage-in-transit rights.
This requirement could cause M to lose its Article 2 resale rights on small shipments
prior to delivery of goods to the buyer.
102. See U.C.C. § 9-113, Comment 1; U.C.C. § 1-201(37); note 85 supra.
103. Accord, Hogan, supra note 6, at 582-83.
104. See U.C.C. § 2-509(1)(a); note 73 supra.
105. Those requirements are: there must have been a written security agreement
signed by W that adequately described the collateral, and L must have given value,
such as its loan, in consideration for the security interest. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a), (b). It
has been assumed throughout that L has filed a financing statement covering this
security agreement, thus perfecting the interest as soon as it attaches. U.C.C. § 9-
303(1). See note 70 supra.
106. The language of § 9-113 contains some ambiguity on this point. Under § 9-
113(c), in this situation "the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are
governed by the Article on Sales (Article 2)." This gives M Article 2 rights, but it does
not totally exclude L from arguing that it retains its Article 9 rights. Moreover, § 9-
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cle 2, however, that L should be able to assert its Article 9
default rights and force M to sell the goods instead of retaining
them and recover any profits made by M on resale of the goods,
or redeem the goods by paying the obligation owed to M. First,
it should be noted that section 2-706(6) (giving M the right to
excess profits), refers only to the seller's right to retain the
profits as against the buyer. 10? L, as a secured party, is not
directly covered by that provision, and thus may be able to
recover such excess proceeds under Article 2. The proper place
to search for such a right is section 2-403, the major Article 2
provision dealing with the rights of parties who are not the
buyer or the seller. 08 L would argue that it has rights under
that section because it is a "purchaser" from W. Under section
1-201(32), purchase includes "any . . . voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property." L's loan to W in return for a
promise to repay and an Article 9 security interest that covers
these goods fits that definition. L would not get rights as a
purchaser under section 2-403(1). That subsection deals with
priority rights to the goods themselves, and it has been as-
sumed throughout that L does not have such priority.09 Any
113 omits priority problems from the scope of its coverage and seems particularly
focused on the relative rights of M and W. L could thus argue that it retains its Article
9 rights without regard to § 9-113(c). The problem with that argument is that M's
Article 2 rights and L's Article 9 rights seem to expressly conflict with respect to the
right to any profit made on resale. But see U.C.C. § 2-706(6) ("The seller is not
accountable to the buyer for any profit made on any resale." (emphasis added)). The
policy arguments outlined below apply equally here to forestall L's reliance on its
Article 9 rights. See text accompanying notes 113-122 infra.
107. "The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit made on any
resale." U.C.C. § 2-706(6) (emphasis added).
108. Section 2-403(1) gives rights to purchasers of goods, including good faith
purchasers for value. Section 2-403(2)-(3) gives rights to buyers in the ordinary course
of business from merchants who deal in goods of the kind bought. Section 2-403(4)
gives rights to other purchasers of goods and to lien creditors.
109. It is possible that, in some circumstances, L could have priority in the goods
under § 2-403(1). There is no explicit requirement in § 2-403 that "buyers" or
"purchasers" must take such an interest from one who has possession of the goods.
Therefore, L could be a purchaser for § 2-403(1) purposes before W took delivery of
the goods. As a purchaser, it would have priority over M if the purchase is in good faith
and for value. Assuming that there are no misdeeds to breach the good faith standard,
a secured party that both gives value and takes a security interest in the goods between
delivery to the carrier and stoppage-in-transit would have priority under § 2-403(1) to
the extent of its security interest. L has an after-acquired property interest, however,
and its rights are more problematic. Although the Code definition of value is very
broad (see U.C.C. § 1-201(44)), Professor McDonnell has argued that the secured party
with an after-acquired property interest should not be treated as a good faith purchaser
for value under § 2-403(1) unless that secured party has actually relied on the goods
to protect its interest. McDonnell, supra note 5, at 454-55, 460. Such reliance is very
unlikely in the case of goods that have not yet even reached the buyer. See text
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rights that L has are subordinate to those of M, and exist only
to the extent of excess of proceeds of resale after satisfaction
of M's underlying obligation. Section 2-403(4) appears to pro-
vide an argument on which L may base a claim for that sur-
plus. The subsection states that the rights of those purchasers
of goods not given rights under 2-403(1) are governed by Article
9. L can argue that it is such a purchaser, that Article 9 gives
it rights in any excess proceeds on resale, and that it can assert
those rights against M. Thus, M would not have its general
Article 2 right to retain the profits on resale, despite neither
having taken an Article 9 security interest nor delivering the
goods to the buyer. Given what seems such an illogical result,
policy considerations should be weighed to determine whether
the Code should be interpreted differently.
In actuality, the result is not as illogical as might first
appear. As a practical matter, few security interests cover as
broad a range of goods as the one used herein. The more tradi-
tional security interest in goods would cover "goods in W's
warehouse," or something of that nature."10 Such interests only
arise after delivery of goods to the buyer, and the sound reasons
for application of Article 9 default rights to those transactions
have been discussed. More importantly, Article 9 secured party
rights on default only arise if L has given notice of its interest
to M.11 This ensures that L is not getting a mere windfall
accompanying note 112 infra.
Moreover, an extension of one recently articulated position would bar application
of § 2-403 prior to delivery of goods. See Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code Apply Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus. LAW.
153 (1977) (arguing that transferee cannot be "buyer" to come within protection of §
9-307(1) until the transferor has possession of the goods). Contra, Tanbro Fabrics Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1976)
(granting "buyer" status although transferor never had possession). Such arguments
have thus far been limited to the buyer-in-ordinary-course provisions, but extension
to cover the problem of purchasers would be consistent with the analysis.
110. See, e.g., R. HENSON & W. DAVENPORT, UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE FORMS AND MATERIALS, Form 9:1775 (1968).
111. A factual predicate to L's right to force sale, to receive notice of resale, and
to have its interest satisfied from any surplus on such resale is that M must have
received notice of L's claimed interest in the goods prior to taking the action involved.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-504(1)(c), 9-504(3), 9-505(2). No notice need be given to exercise the
§ 9-506 right to redeem.
Under the 1962 Official Draft of the Code, M has the duty under Article 9 to notify
L or any other secured party that had filed a financing statement or that was known
by M to have a security interest in the goods. Because the 1962 version is still the law
in the majority of the states, holding M subject to Article 9 in these circumstances
would impose a terrific burden on a seller which has taken no Article 9 interest. The
notice provision was changed in the 1972 Official Draft because the burdens of search
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recovery, but rather that L had relied on its interest in those
goods even before they were delivered to W, Surely most se-
cured parties are not that aware of goods not in their debtor's
possession, even if their security interest is broad enough to
cover such goods. Granting a right to profits on resale to those
who rely on goods still in transit might not have a large im-
pact.12
Given even those limitations, however, the policies and
structure inherent in the Code seem to envision M's unfettered
right to such profits in this situation. First, the "rights" given
to purchasers by section 2-403(4) may not be the default rights
L claims under Article 9. Section 2-403(4) is a priority section,
rather than a default section, and the Code's treatment of di-
vided ownership of goods seems to clearly delineate those two
issues. Interpreting section 2-403(4) in this situation as apply-
ing to Article 9 only for priority purposes is consistent with the
treatment given by section 9-113. The latter section utilizes
Article 2 to resolve most conflicts that arise when the seller is
using a security interest solely under Article 2 before delivery
to the buyer. One set of conflicts conspicuously absent from the
coverage of section 9-113 are those involving priority. Section
9-113 thus seems to envision that, even in this situation, Article
9 should resolve priority disputes, and section 2-403(4) is most
easily read to buttress that intention. Granting Article 9 de-
fault rights to secured parties by virtue of section 2-403(4) in
direct contravention of the result directed by section 9-113(c)
would be in conflict with the "default is different than priority"
structure of the Code.13
Such an argument still leaves for explanation the language
of section 2-706(6), which does not mention secured parties in
granting the seller the right to any profits on resale. The prob-
lem with that language, however, is perhaps best explained
through historical oversight. Section 2-706 is directly patterned
imposed on all secured parties were greater than the likelihood thatfthere would be a
junior security interest actually needing protection. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 233.
112. See Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 947 n.136.
113. Obviously, the Code delineation between default and priority is not com-
plete. After all, the disposition of proceeds mandated by § 9-504(1) is predicated on
the relative priority of the secured parties, and § 2-702, which is a default section,
expressly points to § 2-403, a priority section, to determine the rights of third parties.
The distinction seems clear in § 9-113, however, which is the major Code provision
dealing with the interface of Articles 2 and 9. Therefore, the priority/default distinction
makes a useful argument using the Code's structure that the unsecured buyer should
be able to retain the profits on resale as against a subordinate secured party with an
after-acquired property interest.
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on section 60 of the Uniform Sales Act, which also gave the
seller the right to profits on resale as against the buyer."' Under
that Act, there would have been no need to specify the seller's
right to retain profits as against secured parties in this situa-
tion, because secured parties could not have had an interest in
the goods prior to delivery to the buyer."' The authors of the
Code, in carrying over the language of section 60, probably
overlooked the fact that Article 9 would allow secured creditors
to have an interest in the goods prior to delivery."' This over-
sight should not affect the policy of section 2-706, which is to
give the seller a complete ownership interest in the goods to be
resold. This policy is more completely set forth in the Com-
ments to that section. Comment 2 of section 2-706 states that,
under Article 2, "the seller resells by authority of law, in his
own behalf, [and] for his own benefit. . . ." This Comment
at least implies that any profits from that resale belong solely
to the seller. Comment 11 is even more on point, stating that
"the seller retains profit, if any, without distinction based on
114. The unpaid seller after resale of the goods "shall not thereafter be liable to
the original buyer upon the contract to sell or the sale or for any profit made by such
resale." UNIFORM SALES Acr § 60(1).
115. This result is a corollary to the animosity faced by the after-acquired prop-
erty interest at common law. Utilizing the maxim that "a man cannot grant what he
does not own," courts frequently invalidated sales or transfers of security interests in
goods that took place before the buyer gained possession of the goods. See, e.g., Low
v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347, 348 (1871) (sale of "all the halibut that may be caught by...
the schooner Florence Reed, on the voyage upon which she is about to proceed" invalid
in bankruptcy); Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907) (chattel
mortgagee's security interest in after-acquired property invalidated in bankruptcy).
Because the goods involved in Low and Zartman had actually come into the trans-
feror's possession prior to bankruptcy and yet the transferee's interest in the goods was
invalidated, the transferee of a security interest would have had even less chance of
claiming an interest in goods of which the buyer never gained possession.
Doctrinally, it appears that a security interest could have been transferred prior
to delivery of goods to the buyer. Title could pass to the buyer prior to delivery (see
UNIFORM SALES AcT § 19), and such title presumably could have allowed the buyer to
transfer a security interest in the goods at that point. One difficulty with assuming
that this was in fact a possibility is the dearth of cases actually describing such a
security interest, and this factual lack of such interests makes the rule granting profits
on resale to the buyer as against the seller but ignoring secured parties a reasonable
response by the Uniform Sales Act. The Code structure explicitly sanctions the after-
acquired property interest, however, as well as making security interests attach when
the buyer has rights in the collateral, so the increased number of security interests
likely to be claimed prior to delivery to the buyer makes the language of § 2-706(6)
unfortunately narrow.
116. Such oversight would not be unique to this U.C.C. provision. The tension
between Articles 2 and 9 often makes it appear as if the drafters of each article never
spoke to one another. See Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 985 ("Read literally and
peremptorily, the Code solutions vacillate in an almost schizophrenic manner, result-
ing from the apparent inattention to the relation of Article 9 to Article 2.").
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whether or not he had a lien." The meaning of this Comment
is not totally clear,"7 but it appears to be referring to the seller's
lien under the Uniform Sales Act."8 It can thus be interpreted
as authority for the proposition that the seller's exercise of
rights to withhold, cancel, or stop the goods in transit, despite
the functional similarity of those 'rights to Article 9 security
interests, will not cause the seller to lose its right to retain any
excess proceeds on resale. This Comment, unlike section 2-
706(6), is unlimited in scope. Its language, as well as its policy,
applies equally to buyers and to secured parties. It envisions
the correct result in this situation-that secured parties should
not have Article 9 rights to receive any profit made on re-
sale-and it should be adopted by courts as an amplification
of the meaning of section 2-706(6)."'
The final reason for not granting L any rights in the profits
made on resale is more pragmatic. It is a result that can be
totally obviated by M and W. The only reason L had even an
arguable claim to those profits was because it had a security
interest in the goods, and that security interest did not attach
until W had rights in the collateral.' ° It is possible for M and
W to agree that W has no rights in the goods until delivery.'2 '
117. The relevant language of Comment 11 to § 2-706 reads as follows: "Under
subsection (6), the seller retains profit, if any, without distinction based on whether
or not he had a lien since this Article divorces the question of passage of title to the
buyer from the seller's right of resale or the consequences of its exercise." The first
problem with this Comment is the relationship between the two clauses; there is no
necessary connection between the two statements. More importantly for our purposes,
however, the Comment uses the language of "lien," which is pre-Code jargon,, rather
than using the terminology adopted by the U.C.C. Because of the Comment's early
appearance in the Code, however (it appears in exactly the same form in the May 1949
Draft of the U.C.C.), it presumably refers to the seller's lien under the Uniform Sales
Act. This is probably the better view. If "lien" were interpreted in its more general
sense, the Comment would support the proposition that an Article 2 seller retains its
Article 2 rights despite taking a consensual Article 9 interest. This argument is made
at text accompanying note 126 infra.
118. See UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ 54-56.
119. See Danzig, A Comment On the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 632 (1976), and Skilton, Some Comments on the Com-
ments to the U.C.C., 1966 Wis. L. REV. 597, for a discussion of the relevance of the
Comments to a court deciding issues under the U.C.C.
120. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
121. Section 2-401 is not totally clear as to when a buyer has rights in the goods.
At least if the seller retains title on an F.O.B. destination contract, § 2-401(2)(b)
provides that title will not pass until the goods are delivered to the buyer. Section 2-
401(2)(a) mandates that, unless otherwise agreed, title passes on delivery of goods to
the carrier under an F.O.B. shipment contract. M and W presumably could agree that
title would not pass until delivery to the buyer even though it was an F.O.B. shipment
contract with risk of loss falling on the buyer during shipment. Section 2-401(1) makes
this analysis problematic, however, by stating that "any retention or reservation by
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In such a case, L would have no rights in these goods, because
they were reclaimed by M prior to W gaining any rights in the
collateral. It would be anomalous for L's rights to turn on the
language of the sales agreement between M and W. Foreclosing
L from using its Article 9 default rights without regard to what
that agreement says as to the buyer's and seller's rights in the
goods seems to be the correct result.
2
Before delivery to W, and M has an Article 9 security
interest. It is clear that M, when unsecured, has the right to
any profits made on resale of the goods as against both W and
L. The only remaining issue is whether that result is changed
if M has taken and perfected an Article 9 security interest.
W, once again, seems to be foreclosed from exercising any
rights under Article 9. M can reclaim and resell the goods rely-
ing only on its rights under Article 2,123 and W has no claim
under that Article to any profits made on the resale.'2 1 M's
rights are not absolutely clear, however, and some question
concerning those rights is raised by one possible interpretation
of section 9-113. An argument can be made on the language of
that section that Article 2 default rules are to apply only if the
goods have not been delivered to the buyer and the seller has
a security interest solely under Article 2. 25 Since M does not
have a security interest solely under Article 2, section 9-113,
the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited
in effect to a reservation of a security interest." This could be read to give the buyer
rights in the collateral upon shipment in every case, without regard to explicit contrac-
tual agreement or the risk of loss provisions in the contract. More probably, that
provision is overcome by the more explicit statement in § 2-401(2)(b) that, as a matter
of law, title passes on delivery in an F.O.B. destination contract. The F.O.B. shipment
case is more difficult, but there seems little reason to distinguish that case on the basis
of differing risk-of-loss provisions when the dispute concerns the rights of third parties.
Such provisions, in either case, will not be known to the third parties, and there can
be no justifiable reliance on their part based on differing rules under § 2-401. Therefore,§ 2-401(2) should control, and the parties should be able to explicitly agree in every
case that title will not pass to the buyer until delivery. At the very least, they can so
agree in an F.O.B. destination contract in which risk of loss does not pass to the buyer
until delivery, and such action can be taken if the risk of secured parties claiming
Article 9 default rights is sufficiently great. The most important point under § 2-401
is that the buyer and seller cannot agree that the seller retains title after delivery. This
safeguards the Article 9 default rights after delivery.
122. See Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 946 (anomalous to allow buyer's
rights to turn on the presence or absence of secured parties with rights in the goods);
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 24.
123. U.C.C. §§ 2-705, 2-706.
124. Id. § 2-706(6).
125. See Weingarten, supra note 67, at 554 ("So long as these interests arise
solely under the Article on Sales and so long as the [buyer] ...does not have
possession of the goods. . . the rights of the secured party on default are governed by
the Article on Sales.").
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could be read to prohibit M from exercising its right to retain
profits under Article 2. Comment 5 to section 9-113 seems to
foreclose the possibility of that interpretation, however.'26 The
"security interest solely under the Article on Sales" language
is not a condition to the seller's exercise of default rights pur-
suant to Article 2; it is rather a condition to the application of
section 9-113 in the first place. Since section 9-113 does not
apply, according to Comment 5, M retains all of its rights
under Article 2 even though it has taken an Article 9 security
interest. Only if M exercises rights given only by Article 9 is it
subject to W's rights to excess proceeds of resale. Thus, M
utilizes only its Article 2 default rights and is entitled to retain
those proceeds.
A similar argument applies to M's rights as against L. M
as a seller retains all its Article 2 rights even though it has also
taken an Article 9 security interest, and the argument that
Article 2 should not grant default rights to L remains the same.
There remains the intuitive feeling, however, that M's Ar-
ticle 9 interest should make a difference. M has gained some-
thing by taking an explicit security interest, and it seems equi-
table that it should have to give something in return, such as
its right as against secured parties to retain the profits from
resale of the goods. Such an argument, however, founders on
analysis. The primary benefit gained by M from taking an
Article 9 security interest is more certainty concerning its prior-
ity position in the goods.'2 But for default purposes, the only
real benefit is the section 9-503 right to repossess the goods
after W has gained possession. In exchange for that right, M
does give up its right to excess profits. Before the goods have
been delivered, however, M derives almost no default benefits
from Article 9, and it should not bear any of the burdens of that
Article either. Therefore, even in the situation in which the
seller has taken an Article 9 security interest, it retains its right
to profits made on resale as against both the buyer and other
secured parties. 28
126. "[A] seller who reserves a security interest by agreement does not lose his
rights under the Sales Article, but rights other than those conferred by the Sales Article
depend on full compliance with this Article." U.C.C. § 9-113, Comment 5.
127. By taking and perfecting a consensual Article 9 interest prior to the delivery
of goods to the buyer, the seller has ensured its priority position as a purchase money
secured party as against all other secured parties, so long as it complies with the notice
provisions of § 9-312(3) for goods classified as inventory. For a discussion of the pano-
ply of conflicts with secured parties faced by a seller that does not take such an
interest, see Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 955-83.
128. It has been suggested that Comment 3 to § 9-504 lends force to the argument
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CONCLUSION
This analysis of the default rules under Articles 2 and 9 of
the U.C.C. has shown how the major differences relate to the
relative rights of the buyer, seller, and secured parties to any
increase in value of the goods over the sales price. After careful
analysis, it has concluded that Article 2 rules give such price
benefit to the seller at all times before delivery, and that the
Article 9 rules give the benefit to the buyer and third parties
after the goods have been delivered to the buyer. Whether the
seller has taken an Article 9 security interest makes no differ-
ence in either result.
The one exception to the above rules involves the seller's
right under section 2-702(2) to repossess goods delivered to the
buyer while insolvent. Such a factual situation is a kind of
bridge between the pre- and post-delivery cases, and the policy
issues are more closely balanced. Although the conclusion is
that the Article 2 default rights should apply in such a case,
Article 2 recognizes the equities in favor of some secured parties
by granting them priority over a section 2-702(2) reclaiming
seller.
The general pre-delivery/post-delivery result is in keeping
with the overlap of the broad policies distinguishing Articles 2
and 9.129 Article 2 applies to sales transactions, in which the
seller's major focus is on performance of the contract. Article 9
deals with secured transactions, in which the secured party
takes an interest in the goods mainly to secure the payment of
a debt. In secured party-seller transactions, this distinction
blurs, because the payment secured by the Article 9 interest is
the same as the buyer's obligation to be performed in the Arti-
that Article 2 default rights should apply to transactions for the purchase and sale of
goods without regard to whether one of the parties also has a security interest in the
goods. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 3 n.12. That Comment, and the
language of § 9-504(2) mandate that any surplus after resale of chattel paper'taken as
collateral by sale belongs solely to the buyer, even though all transactions involving
the sale of chattel paper are otherwise governed by the usual Article 9 rules. U.C.C. §
9-102(1)(b). The language of the Comment indicates that this rule could be extended
to all sales that come within Article 9's coverage, arguably implying that Article 2
rights should apply to such other secured sales, but that language is too broad. The
problem is that the rule concerning surplus on resale of chattel paper is accompanied
by a rule barring deficiency judgments. Because the Article 2 seller has rights both to
any surplus on resale and to a deficiency judgment, the policies inherent in § 9-504(2)
and Comment 3 to that section have minimal application to this problem.
129. "Article 2 is primarily devoted to insuring performance of the contract of
sale . . Article 9 is seemingly exclusively devoted to securing the performance of
obligations or payment of debts." Speidel, supra note 6, at 303. See 2 G. GILMOma,
supra note 9, § 432, at 1185-89.
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cle 2 transaction. In response to this blurring, the Code has
given the Article 2 seller certain rights in the goods to ensure
payment of that obligation. Such rights are, theoretically and
functionally, Article 2 rights, and carry along with them the
sales rule for rights to the increased value of the goods. How-
ever, such rights are extinguished on delivery of goods to the
buyer; thereafter Article 9, with its focus on security for the
debt, and its corresponding rule that any increased value of the
goods goes to the buyer and secured parties, provides the
seller's only tool for maintaining an interest in the goods. The
conclusion reached in this article reflects this underlying Code
principle.
This conclusion also roflects the specifics of the Code treat-
ment. Some defects are evident, particularly in the treatment
of secured parties' rights to the profits on resale when the goods
have not been delivered to the buyer. Section 2-706(6) should
probably be amended to read: "the seller is not accountable to
any other party for any profit made on resale." Section 2-403(4)
might also be amended to make clear its focus on priority rights
of the parties. Such amendments would be unnecessary if a
simple change were made in Article 9. The fundamental uncer-
tainty in this entire area revolves around the meaning of the
phrase, "the debtor has rights in the collateral."' 30 An amend-
ment stating that the debtor has no rights in goods purchased
prior to gaining possession of those goods would neatly resolve
the entire conflict. Such a change might remove some interests
from secured parties, but security agreements as generally
drafted do not call for rights in the goods prior to the buyer's
possession in any case. The benefits of such an amendment in
increased certainty of the seller's rights would easily outweigh
the diminution in secured parties' collateral. 3 '
In lieu of such a change, businesses and courts will have
to ensure the correct result. In order to protect their Article 2
rights, sellers will have to provide in their sales contracts that
the buyer gains no rights in the goods prior to possession or, in
the alternative, discover whether its buyers have any secured
creditors with extremely broad security interests. Either of
130. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
131. Anzivino, supra note 73, at 44-52, argues that the buyer cannot have rights
in the collateral even under the Code's present version until it gains possession of the
goods. The Anzivino article suffers from a mistaken concept that "rights in the collat-
eral" means "priority rights in the collateral," and is contrary to the weight of author-
ity. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 42, § 11.5, at 353; Hogan, supra note 6, at 577.
Therefore, an amendment to Article 9 would be necessary to ensure the desired result.
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these courses of action may be too great for the admittedly
minor risk involved, 32 but it is a risk that ought to be con-
sciously weighed by sellers. Courts, for their part, should con-
tinue the task of shaping Code interpretations to meet the
needs of commercial transactions.3 3 The correct result in this
conflict is fairly clear; the U.C.C. should be shaped to reach it.
132. As argued previously, one way for a seller to ensure its right to excess
proceeds upon resale after default is to provide in the agreement with the buyer that
neither risk of loss nor title will pass to the buyer until delivery. See note 121 supra.
This approach obviously imposes cost on the seller, which may or may not be fully
compensated by a change in the sales price.
133. "[R]easonably construed, with a sense of history as well as of the present,
a code can . . . aid the growth of the commercial world by a combination of guidance
and flexibility." Jackson & Peters, supra note 6, at 985.

